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The Supreme Court Says "No" to Equal Treatment
of Puerto Rico: A Comment on
Harris P. Rosario
In the recent case of Harris v. Rosar'o 1, the United States Supreme
Court held that federal welfare laws which treat the residents of Puerto
Rico differently from residents of the mainland do not conflict with the
equal protection guarantees of the U.S. Constitution.2 The subject of the
Rosario suit was the Aid to Families with Dependent Children Program
(AFDC), initiated in 1935 in order to provide financial support to needy
families.3 The program was extended to Puerto Rico in 1950. 4 Under
the AFDC statute the poor receive their payments from state or territo-
rial governments, and those governments are then reimbursed from the
federal treasury for a percentage of their expenditures. 5 The law specifies
that Puerto Rico and the other U.S. territories are to be treated differ-
ently in the reimbursement plan. 6 Reimbursement to the fifty states is
set at a higher level than reimbursement to Puerto Rico. 7 Furthermore,
the legislation places a ceiling on the aggregate amount that can be spent
in Puerto Rico for AFDC and other Social Security programs.8
In May 1977, the Legal Services Corporation of Puerto Rico filed a
1 100 S. Ct. 1929 (1980).
2 Id at 1930.
3 Pub. L. No. 271, 49 Stat. 627 (1935) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-610
(1976)).
4 Amendments to Child Welfare Provisions of the Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 734,
64 Stat. 550 (1950) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 603 (1976)).
5 42 U.S.C. § 603 (1976).
6 Puerto Rico could be reimbursed under the formula provided for in 42 U.S.C. § 603(2)
(1976), which is discriminatory; however, id § 1318 gives it the option of seeking reimbursement
under the more lucrative Medicaid formulas, id. § 1396d(b). As this was the method actually
used by the island, § 1396d(b) was the statute challenged in the-Rosario litigation.
7 For the states, reimbursement under § 1396d(b) fluctuates between 50% and 83% of the
amount they have spent, not counting administrative costs, depending on the per capita income
of the particular state. Those states with the highest per capita income receive the least from
the federal government and those with the lowest per capita income receive the most. Id
§ 1396d(b). For Puerto Rico the percentage is fixed at 50%, the lowest rate, even though per
capita income on the island is much lower than it is in Mississippi, the poorest state. Keifer,
Treating Puerto Rico as a State Under Federal Tax and Expenditure Programs. A Preliminaoy Economic
Analysis, 39 REV. C. ABo. P.R. 657, 666 (1978). Congress has altered this procedure for a single
year, setting Puerto Rico's reimbursement rate at 75%. Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600,
§ 802(a), 92 Stat. 2945 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1318 (Supp. I1 1979)).
8 42 U.S.C. § 1308 (1976). Congress raised the ceiling for Puerto Rico and other U.S.
possessions for one year, 1979. Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 802(a), 92 Stat. 2945
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1318 (Supp. III 1979)).
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class action suit in U.S. District Court in San Juan, challenging this dis-
proportionate dispersal of federal money.9 The plaintiff class included a
wide variety of AFDC recipients. Carmen Rivera Berrios, a widow living
with her eleven-year-old son in a squatter community, was one of the
named plaintiffs. Her case illustrates the class grievance. Since her hus-
band drowned in 1970, Senora Rivera Berrios had lived on a monthly
welfare check of twenty-six dollars. '0 Were she living in any of the fifty
states, her check would have been much higher." Legal Services attor-
neys therefore argued that she was being discriminated against because
of her place of residence. Such discrimination, they contended, violated
the equal protection guarantee implied in the due process clause of the
fifth amendment' 2 because Puerto Rican residents, who were granted
U.S. citizenship in 1917,' 3 were entitled to equal protection under fed-
eral law. Counsel for plaintiffs further asserted that the AFDC statute
was unconstitutional because it denied the rights of a suspect class-a
politically powerless minority that has suffered from purposeful unequal
treatment in the past and now is injured by the contested legislation.'"
In other equal protection cases the Supreme Court has given "strict scru-
tiny" to laws which utilize a suspect classification. Strict scrutiny in
practice has meant that such laws are unconstitutional unless the govern-
ment can show a compelling state purpose that is served by the classifica-
tion scheme. 15
Lawyers for the Department of Health, Education and Welfare ar-
gued that the AFDC legislation was constitutionally sound because
neither a fundamental interest nor a suspect class was involved. That
being the case, the true issue was whether the AFDC statute had a ra-
tional basis. Defense counsel noted that the United States had ample
reason to treat Puerto Rico differently because the island makes little
contribution to the U.S. Treasury. 16 Chief Judge Jose V. Toledo of the
9 Rosario v. Califano, No. 77-303 (D.P.R. Oct. 1, 1979). For a discussion of the role of
Legal Services Corporations in altering the administration of AFDC payments, see Bloch, Coop-
erative Federalism and the Role of Litigation in AFDC Egibilty Poh, 1979 WIs. L. REV. 1.
10 Jurisdictional Statement, Brief for Appellee, app. II at 37a, Harris v. Rosario, 100 S. Ct.
1929 (1980).
I Average AFDC payments in Puerto Rico in 1977 were $47.00, whereas the average
payments on the U.S. mainland were $187.00, four times as much. Id at 41a.
12 Motion for Summary Affirmance, Brief for Appellee at 16-19, Harris v. Rosario, 100 S.
Ct. 1929 (1980). The implied equal protection component of the fifth amendment has been
recognized in a variety of Supreme Court cases. See, e.g., Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168
(1964); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
13 Act of March 2, 1917, ch. 145, § 5, 39 Stat. 951 (Jones Act) (current version at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1402 (1976)).
14 Motion for Summary Aflirmance, Brief for the Appellee at 16-17, Harris v. Rosario, 100
S. Ct. 1929 (1980).
15 The standard of strict scrutiny because of a racial classification first emerged in Kore-
matsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). For a discussion of how the test has been applied
see, Coven & Fersh, Equal Protetion, Social Welfare Litigation, the Burger Court, 51 NoTRE DAME
LAW. 873, 875-78 (1976).
16 Jurisdictional Statement, Brief for the Appellant at 10-14, Harris v. Rosario, 100 S. Ct.
1929 (1980).
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United States District Court for Puerto Rico rejected these contentions
and ruled that the statute was unconstitutional, citing the arguments set
forth by plaintiffs. 1
7
The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (which re-
placed the Department of Health, Education and Welfare) and Secre-
tary Patricia Harris (who replaced Joseph Califano) appealed the
decision. In Harris v. Rosario the U.S. Supreme Court reversed Judge To-
ledo, finding that the challenged law did not violate the equal protection
guarantee. 18 The two-paragraph per curi'am opinion of the Supreme
Court offered a pair of justifications for summary judgment on the issue:
(1) the territorial clause of the U.S. Constitution empowered Congress
"to make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory'"
and (2) Puerto Rico may be treated differently than the fifty states under
federal law if there is a rational basis for the differentiation.20 The Court
found three reasons why the treatment accorded the Puerto Rican resi-
dents was rational. First, the majority pointed out that residents of Pu-
erto Rico do not contribute to the U.S. Treasury, primarily because they
do not pay federal income taxes. 2 1 Second, the Justices calculated that
treating Puerto Rico as a state would be costly.2 2 And, finally, they con-
cluded that the payment of higher Social Security benefits to Puerto Ri-
can residents might disrupt the island's economy.2 3
These three rationale were drawn from the Court's holding in an
earlier case, Califano v. Torres.24 In Tortes the Justices had ruled that the
complete exclusion of Puerto Rico from the Supplemental Security In-
come (SSI) program did not violate the constitutional right to travel be-
cause the exclusion had a rational basis.2 5 Although the issue in Torres
had been whether a complete denial of SSI benefits constituted a viola-
tion of the right to travel, the Court had mentioned the equal protection
issue in a footnote, suggesting that congressional legislation discriminat-
ing against island residents could survive an equal protection chal-
lenge. 26
Justices Brennan and Blackmun objected to the'summary disposi-
tion of Hams v. Rosano because they were not persuaded that the Torres
decision should be controlling.2 7 Justice Marshall openly dissented, as-
serting that Torres had left the equal protection question undecided.2 8
17 Rosario v. Califano, No. 77-303 (D.P.R.), reprinedin Jurisdictional Statement, Brief for
the Appellant, app. A at 19a, Harris v. Rosario, 100 S. Ct. 1929 (1980).
18 100 S. Ct. at 1930.
19 Id (citing U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 3, cl. 2).
20 Id.
21 Id
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 435 U.S. I, 5 n.7 (1977).
25 Id at 5.
26 Id at 3 n.4.
27 100 S. Ct. at 1930.
28 Id at 1931 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall argued that Ton-es had been
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He especially rejected the majority view that congressional action pursu-
ant to the territorial clause need only be rationally based in order to
survive an equal protection challenge. According to Justice Marshall,
Puerto Ricans, as U.S. citizens, deserve the usual rights of equal protec-
tion and, consequently, discriminatory legislation directed at island resi-
dents in fact may merit "[h]eightened scrutiny under the equal
protection component of the Fifth Amendment. '29 The dissenting Jus-
tice also questioned whether there was truly a rational basis for the legis-
lative discrimination.3 0 He pointed out that it is not obviously rational
to provide lower benefits to citizens who have the greatest need and that
a geographic area should not have the level of its anti-poverty aid re-
duced simply because it has a weak economy.3 ' Justice Marshall com-
plained that even when measured by the Court's "deferential equal
protection standard," the congressional limitation on AFDC payments to
Puerto Rico raised a serious constitutional question that warranted com-
plete briefing and oral argument, not summary judgment.3 2
One can appreciate the effect which the summary holding will have
on the rights of Puerto Rican residents only by examining it in light
of the legislation and jurisprudence that have determined those rights.
Puerto Rico was ceded to the United States in 1898 under the Treaty of
Paris,33 which ended the Spanish-American War. In the Foraker Act of
1900, 34 Congress provided for the administration of the island by the
U.S. president and declared that the residents should be "citizens of
Porto [sic] Rico,"35 a category of nationality which brought the islanders
under the protection of the U.S. flag without extending to them the ben-
efits of U.S. citizenship.
The opening of the twentieth century marked the emergence of the
United States as a world power; shortly after the passage of the Foraker
Act, the Supreme Court decided a series of cases which would have a
major impact on the treatment of the newly acquired U.S. territories.3 6
On their face these cases involved whether or not Puerto Rico was to be
treated as a part of the mainland for the purpose of tariff administration.
If Puerto Rico and the other possessions were considered to be part of the
decided entirely on the basis of the right to travel and therefore no equal protection question
had been before the Court in that case. Id
29 Id
30 Id
3' Id
32 Id
33 Treaty of Peace, Dec. 10, 1898, United States-Spain, art. II, 30 Stat. 1754.
34 An Act Temporarily to provide revenues and a civil government for Puerto Rico, 31
Stat. 77 (1900) (current version codified in scattered sections of 48 U.S.C.).
35 This official misspelling of Puerto Rico, carried over from the Treaty of Paris, contin-
ued until 1932 when it was altered by an act of Congress, 47 Stat. 158 (1932) (codified at 48
U.S.C. § 731 (1976)). &e Cabranes, Ciizetship and the American Emptie: Notes on the Legislative
History of the United States Citizenship of Puerto Ricans, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 391, 392 n.1 (1978).
36 Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 234
(1901); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901); De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901).
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United States itself, then the uniformity clause of the Constitution, arti-
cle I, section 8, would bar Congress from imposing any tariff barriers
upon trade with the island and, by implication, would guarantee that
the Constitution of the United States and the complete body of federal
law would be applied equally in both the mainland states and the new
possessions. The ultimate result in these "Insular Cases", however, was
quite the opposite--Congress was given free reign to impose tariffs on
territorial commerce with the mainland.3 7 Furthermore, inhabitants of
territories like Puerto Rico were not guaranteed the protection of the Bill
of Rights. 38 Thus, the lasting significance of the Insular Cases lies not in
their effect on tariff administration (although that was crucial to the pro-
tection of mainland business interests39 such as Louisiana sugar produ-
cers), but in their establishment of a precedent for unequal treatment of
the newly acquired U.S. possessions under both the U.S. Constitution
and federal statutes.
The United States Supreme Court justified this position by distin-
guishing incorporated territories, such as the Louisiana Purchase lands
and Alaska, from unincorporated territories, such as Puerto Rico and the
Philippines. According to the Court, the former were destined for state-
hood from the time of their annexation as U.S. possessions-a judgment
based on the Court's perception of congressional intent at the time of the
annexation-whereas the latter were merely dependencies under the rule
of the federal sovereign. 4° Because the unincorporated territories were
not to become states, then, theoretically, their residents were not entitled
to all the privileges and protections afforded to the residents of the states.
The doctrine of unincorporated territories therefore set the stage for une-
qual treatment of peoples who were subject to federal laws. Geographi-
cal discrimination was henceforth permissible. As a result of this judicial
interpretation, the inhabitants of unincorporated territories could be de-
nied the full protection of the Constitution in subsequent Supreme Court
decisions, even after they were granted U.S. citizenship.
37 Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 287 (1901).
38 This became apparent in subsequent decisions relying on the Insular Cases. Ste, e.g.,
Balzac v. Puerto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1921) (denial of right to jury trial); Dorr v. United States,
195 U.S. 138 (1904) (denial of right to jury trial).
39 Set Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 374 (1901) (Fuller, J., dissenting).
4o The doctrine of unincorporated territories was first mentioned by Justice Edward
White in his concurring opinion in Downes v. Bidwell, id. at 287-344 (White, J., concurring). It
was first adopted by the majority of the Court in Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904).
There were four dissenters in the Downes case (Justices Fuller, Harlan, Brewer, and Peckham)
who would have required the uniform application of the Constitution to all U.S. territories. In
reference to the majority decision Justice Fuller wrote,
[T]he contention seems to be that, if an organized and settled province of another
sovereignty is acquired by the United States, Congress has the power to keep it,
like a disembodied shade, in an intermediate state of ambiguous existence for an
indefinite period; and more than that, that after it has been called from that
limbo, commerce with it is absolutely subje&' to the will of Congress, irrespective
of Constitutional provisions.
195 U.S. at 372 (Fuller, J., dissenting).
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As the Rosarto decision demonstrates, the doctrine of unincorporated
territories has had an enduring effect on the status of Puerto Rico vis A
vis the U.S. government. Undoubtedly, the island's relationship to the
federal government has not been completely static. Within the last thirty
years there have been significant changes in the political organization of
Puerto Rico. In 1950, Congress granted the Puerto Rican people the
right to choose their own government under a Puerto Rican Constitu-
tion. 4 1 By 1952, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico was in existence.
42
The island has since had an autonomous government unlike that in any
other U.S. territory. It has become, as the Spanish version of the Puerto
Rican Constitution puts it, a "Freely Associated State."'43 In fact, some
commentators have asserted that the Commonwealth compact altered
the constitutional status of the island so fundamentally that it is no
longer subject to the territorial clause of the U.S. Constitution because
Puerto Rico is now self-governing.44 Moreover, in a series of decisions
since 1952, the Supreme Court has extended the protections of the Bill of
Rights to the island, thus qualifying some of its previous decisions. For
example, Puerto Ricans being tried under Puerto Rican law are guaran-
teed the rights of due process and equal protection in the same way that
residents of the states are guaranteed fair treatment under state law by
virtue of the fourteenth amendment.
45
Puerto Rico, however, clearly has not gained the status of statehood;
instead it retains many of the attributes of an unincorporated depen-
dency. In its recent due process rulings, the Supreme Court carefully
avoided any pronouncement on the new political status of the island.
The Justices held that due process rights against the Puerto Rican au-
thorities are guaranteed by either the fifth amendment, which pertains to
actions of federal agents, or the fourteenth amendment, which pertains
to actions of state agents, without deciding between the two.46 In this
manner, the Court avoided "the Commonwealth question"-whether or
not a freely associated state is still a U.S. territory. The 1950 Puerto
Rican Federal Relations Act 4 7 has emphasized the new independent gov-
41 An Act to Provide for the Organization of a Constitutional Government by the People
of Puerto Rico; Pub. L. No. 600, 64 Stat. 319 (1950) (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 731b (1976)).
42 Magruder, The Commonwealth Status ofPuerto Rico, 15 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1, 12 (1953).
43 Note,;./Pede el Congreso Dtscriminar Contra los Residentes de Puerto Rico al Aprobar Leyes Na-
cionales que hroveen Beneicitos a los Indwiduous.' Rodrguez C'ntr6n v. Richardson, 45 REv. JUR. U.P.R.
45, 62 (1976) (el Estado Libre Asociado).
44 Liebowitz, The Applicabilty ofFederal Law to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 56 GEO. L.J.
219, 233 (1967); see also, Montalvo v. Colon, 377 F. Supp. 1332 (1974).
45 Examining Bd. v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 599-601 (1976) (due process challenge
to Puerto Rican statute requiring licensed civil engineers to be citizens); Calero-Toledo v. Pear-
son Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 668-69 n.5 (1974) (due process challenge to seizure of
yacht by Puerto Rican authorities).
The Supreme Court has also recently ruled that fourth amendment protections apply in
Puerto Rico. Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 471 (1979).
46 See, e.g., Examining Bd. v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 601 (1975); Calero-Toledo v.
Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 668-69 n.5 (1973).
47 Pub. L. No. 600, 64 Stat. 319 (1950) (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 731b (1976)).
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ernment of the island; however, it kept the residents within congressional
control. 48  Under the commonwealth compact, Puerto Rico has no
power to conduct foreign relations-the stars and stripes are still flying
over the Caribbean island. More importantly, U.S. statutes continue to
be good law in Puerto Rico despite the absence of Puerto Rican mem-
bers in the U.S. Congress, other than a Resident Commissioner who has
no vote, and despite the absence of Puerto Ricans in the electoral col-
lege. 49
The commonwealth legislation, therefore, had a paradoxical effect.
On the one hand, Puerto Ricans gained more control over their own
affairs; on the other hand, the federal sovereign maintained responsi-
bility for the governance of the island. Welfare legislation illustrates the
problems inherent in the paradox. Since the 1960's Congress has voted
to extend social service programs to the island,50 thus accepting responsi-
bility for the well-being of the residents; but, at the same time, the legis-
lators have strictly limited the federal commitment to social service
spending, thus placing the rest of the burden on the Commonwealth gov-
ernment.
5 1
Harris v. Rosario raised two questions regarding this system of cooper-
ative territorial government. First, plaintiffs sought to show that Puerto
Rican residents are entitled to claim equal protection under the U.S.
Constitution where the actions of the federal authorities seem to be dis-
criminatory. 52 The Supreme Court implicitly recognized that islanders
have this right by deciding to hear the case. The Court then had to
address the essential question of whether the fifth amendment prohibits
discriminatory treatment of Puerto Rico in federal legislation. The
Court gave a negative answer to this question, basing its result upon con-
gressional authority to make laws necessary for the governance of the
U.S. territories. 53 The Court held that legislation regarding the territo-
ries may treat them differently as long as the legislation has a rational
basis. 54 Arguably, this holding is a throwback to the Insular Cases,
where discriminatory legislation regarding unincorporated territories was
upheld. 55 In Rosario, the Court treats Puerto Rico as if it were an unin-
corporated territory and thus subject to a lower standard of equal protec-
tion scrutiny.
The Rosario decision not only demonstrates how the Supreme Court
48 Magruder, supra note 42, at 8, 17.
49 Cabranes, supra note 35, at 489-90.
50 There are now twenty-two significant federal grant-in-aid programs that have the same
sort of statutory restrictions as those at issue in Rosan'o. Keifer, supra note 7, at 677.
51 For a discussion of the effect this social spending has had on Puerto Rican-U.S. rela-
tions, see Leibowitz, The Drift of the Commonwealth, 34 REv. C. ABO. P.R. 635 (1973).
52 Jurisdictional Statement, Brief for the Appellee at 14, Harris v. Rosario, 100 S. Ct. 1929
(1980).
53 100 S. Ct. at 1930.
54d
55 See text accompanying notes 36-40 supra.
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views a U.S. territory, but also underlines the manner in which the Court
is now treating equal protection challenges. The Warren Court ex-
panded the concept of equal protection during the 1960's and allowed
the judiciary to take an active role in the overthrow of discriminatory
legislation. 56 At that time, the Court established a two-tiered equal pro-
tection test under which any law utilizing a suspect class, for instance,
race, 57 or any law involving a fundamental right, such as the right to
interstate travel, 58 would be given "strict scrutiny" under the U.S. Con-
stitution.59 Unless the Court could discern some compelling state inter-
est to justify a discriminatory classification, the law was declared
unconstitutional. 60 If no such fundamental interest or suspect class were
present, then the question became whether or not the government had a
rational basis for its legislative action; that is, whether the law had a
valid governmental purpose.61 This standard of minimum scrutiny was
applied in a variety of regulatory situations in which the Court upheld
federal attempts to control business activities.
62
In the Burger Court, equal protection issues have been given differ-
ent treatment. The Court has refused to recognize new suspect classes,
such as the poor, and, in fact, has rarely engaged in the close scrutiny of
an equal protection claim. 63 It has, instead, jumped directly into a
search for the rational basis of the alleged discrimination. 64 This is espe-
cially true in the area of welfare legislation, where the Court has upheld
both state65 and federal 66 efforts to impose fiscal restraints on aid pro-
grams, even when those efforts have caused hardship among an identifi-
able class of plaintiffs. 6 7
The summary judgment in Hars v. Rosarto follows this pattern pre-
cisely. In Rosario, the Court failed to consider plaintiffs' demand for close
scrutiny of the suspect classification, noting simply that the Constitution
empowers Congress to make necessary laws regarding the territories. 68
The majority then examined the rational basis for the welfare legislation
being challenged and concluded that the need to contain spending and
protect the economy of Puerto Rico gave Congress a rational basis for
the legislation.
69
56 Coven & Fersh, supra note 15, at 874-77.
57 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
58 See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
59 Coven & Fersh, supra note 15, at 874-76.
60 Id at 875-76.
61 Id. at 874-75.
62 Note, Equal Protectton. Modes of Analysis in the Burger Court, 53 DEN. L.J. 687, 712-13
(1976).
63 Id at 691-92.
64 Id. at 688, 702-12.
65 Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
66 Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971).
67 Note, supra note 62, at 689.
68 100 S. Ct. at 1930.
69 Id.
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Dissenting Justice Thurgood Marshall attacked the decision of the
majority because of its refusal to consider whether close scrutiny of the
discriminatory legislation might be appropriate.70 Was the Court, in
fact, ignoring a suspect class in Rosario? Certainly the class of Puerto
Rican residents eligible for welfare benefits is unlike any other suspect
class recognized in constitutional jurisprudence. It is not a racial cate-
gory, although most of its members are non-white, and it is not a reli-
gious category, although most of its members are Catholic. In any event,
the welfare legislation does not discriminate on the basis of a previously
recognized suspect classification; rather, it relies on geographical bounda-
ries. The purpose of the equal protection right is to assure that a minor-
ity does not suffer from prejudicial legislation passed by the majority-
laws must be applied uniformly to all. Residents of territorial posses-
sions, however, have historically suffered from unequal treatment under
the law;7 ' thus, geographical categorization has been seen as acceptable.
The arguments of plaintiffs in Rosario were therefore quite novel. They
were asking the Court to rule that Puerto Rico has been treated unfairly
throughout its history because of its status as a territory. There are rea-
sonable arguments in support of this position. Puerto Ricans are power-
less to influence the decision-making process of the majority, and they
have indeed suffered from unequal treatment in the past. Moreover, it is,
on its face, highly inequitable to deny adequate social services to a group
of U.S. citizens by cutting back federal funding to the group merely be-
cause it is located in a U.S. territory. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that any
panel of Supreme Court justices would hold that residents of a territorial
dependency are automatically part of a suspect class. To do so would
disrupt congressional power to deal with territories as territories because
residents of U.S. possessions would have to be treated as citizens of the
states. Puerto Rico's commonwealth status complicated the issue but did
not change the outcome. In the past the Supreme Court has avoided any
ruling on the political significance of commonwealth status.72 The deci-
sion in Harris v. Rosario is significant because it closes the door on that
problem-an area which has been designated a commonwealth is still a
U.S. territory and, as such, is subject to legislative discrimination.
Given that legislative discrimination based on the territorial clause
does not demand close scrutiny, was the legislation regarding the AFDC
program rationally justified? Did the Court find an appropriate rational
basis for the law?73 First, the majority noted that Puerto Rican residents
are exempted from the individual income tax and that, as a consequence,
they make no contribution to the federal coffers. 74 It follows from this
70 Id at 1931 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
71 Camacho-Negr6n & Larson, In the Promotion of Well-Being. The Situation of Puerto Rico
Under the United States Constt'ution, 40 REV. C. ABO. P.R. 11, 14-20 (1979).
72 See text accompanying note 46 supra.
73 100 S. Ct. at 1932 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
74 Id at 1930.
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line of reasoning that the Puerto Rican government, which imposes and
collects its own individual income tax, should use the revenues from that
tax to fulfill social security needs on the island. The majority, however,
fails to recognize the theoretical and practical fallacies in this rationale.
In theory, welfare spending in an area of the United States is not based
on that area's ability to contribute to federal revenues. The opposite is
true; in the poorest areas of the mainland the federal government makes
the largest contribution. 75 The fact that Puerto Rican residents are ex-
empted from the U.S. income tax should not mean that they also are to
be denied anti-poverty aid. Moreover, in practice, the island is so poor
that individual taxation fails to raise substantial revenues. 76 Puerto Rico
is caught in the taxation trap experienced by many poor countries. In
order to encourage industrialization and promote economic growth,
many developing nations have offered tax incentives to corporations that
choose to enter their boundaries. 77 In the case of Puerto Rico, the incen-
tives are two-sided: Puerto Rico waives the right to tax corporations,
sometimes for as long as twenty-five years, and the United States does the
same, by offering special tax benefits to "possessions corporations. ' 78
Therefore, a lucrative source of tax revenue is lost to both the Common-
wealth and the United States. Both governments are consequently un-
able to fund anti-poverty programs from money gathered on the island.
At the same time, the development strategy, which relies on corporate
investment to produce beneficial economic effects, has failed to relieve
the massive social problems on the island.79
Second, the Court noted that full extension of the AFDC program
to Puerto Rico would mean that an additional $30 million per year
would be spent from federal revenues.80 This fact alone is cited as a
rational basis for the challenged statute."' The Court also was concerned
that a decision in favor of plaintiffs might result in the overthrow of other
discriminatory aspects of the Social Security system as it is administered
in Puerto Rico, with the consequence that the U.S. government would be
compelled to spend an extra $240 million annually. 2 While this is a
powerful motive for Congress to cut off funds to Puerto Rico at a certain
level, the issue facing the Court under its own formulation of the equal
protection standard was whether the means employed by Congress were
congruent with the purpose of the AFDC program. The Court fails to
recognize that Puerto Rico would be entitled to this anti-poverty aid pre-
cisely because the island is extremely poor. Cutting off funds to those
75 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396d(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1980).
76 See Keifer, supra note 7, at 670-71.
77 See, t.g., PRICE, WATERHOUSE & Co., INFORMATION GUIDE FOR THOSE DOING BusI-
NESS IN MEXICO 107 (1979).
78 Kiefer, supra note 7, at 659-63.
79 Id. at 668-69.
80 100 S. Ct. at 1930 n.*.
81 Id at 1930.
82 Id at n.*.
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who are most in need by establishing an arbitrary ceiling on spending is
not a rational means of running a social services program.a3
Finally, the Court noted that increased federal spending in Puerto
Rico could seriously disrupt the fragile economy of the island.8 4 This
basis for denial of benefits is the most troubling of the rationale advanced
by the Court.8 5 It is undeniable that Puerto Rico's economy is in sad
shape-unemployment among those capable of working is calculated at
59% (despite the fact that approximately one-half of the island's popula-
tion has left for the United States),8 6 inflation exceeds levels on the main-
land, and per capita income is still 64% below the U.S. average.8 7
Significantly, the cost of living in San Juan is comparable to that in
Washington, D.C.,8 8 making poverty in Puerto Rico a tremendous hand-
icap. Furthermore, economic priorities are not set by Puerto Ricans.
The economy is dominated by non-resident investors who own more
than half of the capital assets on the island.8" As Jose Herrero, an econo-
mist at the University of Puerto Rico, has noted, the Commonwealth is
"an economic parasite of the United States." ° The Court offers no ex-
planation for the sort of effects that extra AFDC spending would have in
this situation. Presumably, the majority was worried about the effect
that welfare money would have on unemployment by further discourag-
ing recipients from seeking jobs.9 1 Yet, such a disincentive would oper-
ate with equal force on the mainland as a drag on economic growth
within a depressed area, and could hardly be justification for a cut-off of
funds to one of the states. The Supreme Court was not bound to decide
the wisdom of a welfare payment scheme as an economic measure; in-
stead, its task was to find whether the discriminatory treatment of Puerto
Rico had a rational basis. The argument that Congress afforded Puerto
Rico unequal treatment in order to protect the Puerto Rican economy is
not supported by the legislative history of the AFDC statutes9 2 and is
illogical. Congress could not "protect" the Puerto Rican economy by
denying the island equal access to federal funding.
The rational bases discussed by the majority in Rosario are sorely
inadequate. As several commentators have noted, the federal govern-
83 Set id at 1932 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
84 Id at 1930.
85 See id. at 1932 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
86 Herrero, La Economia de Puerto Rico. El rsente Critico, 45 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 197, 201-02
(1976) (commentator's translation).
87 Keifer, supra note 7, at 666.
88 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, FEDERAL INTERAGENCY STUDY
GROUP, ECONOMIC STUDY OF PUERTO Rico, SOCIAL CONDITIONS AND HUMAN SERVICES
PROGRAM (1978), cited in Jurisdictional Statement, Brief for the Appellee at 24-26, Harris v.
Rosario, 100 S. Ct. 1929 (1980).
89 Keifer, supra note 7, at 666.
90 Herrero, supra note 86, at 200. (commentator's translation).
91 Puerto Ricans share this concern. Id
92 100 S. Ct. at 1932 (Marshall, J., dissenting); accord, Camacho-Negr6n & Larson, supra
note 71, at 18.
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ment has assumed responsibility for the well-being of Puerto Rican resi-
dents and there is no good justification for continuing to treat the
islanders as second class citizens. 93 Many Puerto Ricans welcomed the
advent of the Commonwealth in 1952 as an opportunity for the island to
obtain a dignified self-governing status,94 but the Rosario decision clearly
highlights the inadequacy of the new form of government. Those Puerto
Ricans in favor of statehood may use the Rosario holding to argue that
only statehood will provide equal treatment for the islanders. On the
other hand, those factions favoring independence can use the decision to
argue that the economy of the island will be saved only if it is directed by
the local population, that Puerto Rico can not be secure socially until the
economy is reoriented, and that the United States Supreme Court has
shown how commonwealth status relegates Puerto Rico to an inferior,
dependent position with regard to the United States.
As the debate over Puerto Rico's future shows, the real significance
of the Rosarto holding lies in its political consequences. The territories of
the United States are remnants of the American Empire built at the turn
of the century. The decision in Harris v. Rosario rests implicitly upon the
outmoded concept of unincorporated territories, a convenient paradigm
utilized by the Court during past periods of U.S. expansionism. 95 The
precedential value of this idea, which originated in the Insular Cases, is
highly questionable. The Court itself gradually has extended the bene-
fits of the Bill of Rights to the territories and devitalized the paradigm;
nevertheless, in Rosario the Court has taken a step backward. It has
ruled, in a summary judgment, that the Constitution gives Congress a
blank check in dealing with the territories so long as congressional ac-
tions have some discernible rational basis. Such a holding could have
devastating consequences for the quality of life in U.S. possessions, espe-
cially during an era of severe fiscal restraint. Could Congress rationally
refuse to provide any AFDC or Medicaid benefits in the territories?
Under the rationale advanced in Rosario such an action seems quite pos-
sible, as it is difficult to find any reason why budgetary necessity would
not be enough to give such legislation a rational basis. 96 Moreover, con-
gressional discriminations similar to those at issue in Rosario may be, and
have been, imposed on the other U.S. territories--Guam, American Sa-
moa, and the Virgin Islands.9 7
The United States should reject neo-colonialism and attempt to aid
93 Leibowitz, supra note 44, at 270. See also an article supporting this contention, which
was written by the defendant in the Rosario case, Harris, Deoelopmental Problems in the Concept of
Citizenship with Particular Attention to the United States-Puerto Rico Citizenshtp, 15 HOWARD L.J. 47,
53 (1968).
94 Magruder, supra note 42, at 16, 20.
95 Se text accompanying notes 36-40 supra.
9r The rational basis test has been the standard applied in recent Social Security cases.
Set, e.g., Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170 (1978); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471
(1970).
97 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1308 (1976 & Supp. I1 1979).
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both its own territories and the independent, underdeveloped nations in
their efforts to achieve economic self-sufficiency. Many Latin American
nations have recently attempted to alter their dependent relationship
with thedeveloped countries and to redirect their economies so as to
benefit internal social development. Puerto Rico needs the same sort of
economic redirection; however, it is caught in a paradoxical relationship
with the United States that restricts its ability to determine its own
destiny. At the same time, the U.S. Congress has refused to extend
equality in social services to the island.
At issue in the Rosano case was a question which is crucial to the
future administration of U.S. dependencies-whether the Constitution of
the United States allows Congress to limit aid to the territories, merely
because they are territories, and thereby discriminate against their in-
habitants. Historically, such discrimination has been allowed; however,
one may question whether the territorial clause of the Constitution still
should be interpreted to allow for purposeful unequal treatment of the
needy citizens who reside in the U.S. possessions. The point is not that
territorial residents are entitled to welfare benefits, because no U.S. resi-
dent is automatically entitled to welfare benefits.98 The point is that all
of the nation's citizens should be entitled to equal protection under fed-
eral law. Since 1900, the U.S. Supreme Court has had the responsibility
of determining the rights and privileges of the people of Puerto Rico. In
Ham's v. Rosario the Court summarily rejected an opportunity to correct
past injustices. The majority could have overthrown the stale precedent
set in the Insular Cases and ordered that the laws be applied uniformly
to every area which flies the U.S. flag, or it could have found that geo-
graphical discrimination creates a suspect class. Given, however, that
the consequence of such rulings would be an emasculation of the power
of Congress pursuant to the territorial clause, a less radical alternative
would have been more appropriate. For instance, the Justices might
have ruled that budgetary expediency cannot be used to justify unequal
treatment of territorial residents and that Congress had expressed no
other rational basis for the challenged statute. Such a holding would
have assured that future legislative discriminations must be rationally
related to the purpose of the law and not merely attempts to save money
at the expense of a geographically determined group. But, instead of
choosing any of these courses, the Court turned back the clock and sim-
ply said "no" to equal treatment of Puerto Rico.
-STEWART W. FISHER
98 Coven & Fersh,supra note 15, at 885. Cf Harris v. McRae, 100 S. Ct. 2671, 2688 (1980)
(federal government has no duty to provide funding for abortions).

